Remote control of an impact demonstration vehicle by Harney, P. F. et al.
NASA Technical Memorandum 85925
Nfls Ii -"1m -8$9~s
NASA-TM-85925Jq~aOOI fJ48tJ
Remote Control of an Impact
Demonstration Vehicle
Paul F. Harney, James B. Craft, Jr., and Richard G. Johnson
April 1985
NI\S/\
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
U~~1~U~ ~l!~\~
OC\ '2. ~, '\'jt3S
V.NGLEV RESSARCl-l CENTER
l.IBRr.R'l'. N/>.St\H.~.!.'P10HI 'JIRGINI,..
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19850015486 2020-03-20T18:41:40+00:00Z
"
12
.# ••••:.-":.-.
L!..L::j
H-1282 WAS lc15:85925 PAPER-542 85/04/00 i2 PAGES UNCLASSIFIED
r'!(':r'~ !\i!="~~~T
W-~_····_#"j' 'L'·~ ~
1.J~ 1L: Rern()te C:~)~-itr()l CiT ;3r~ ifn~~,3::t (iemor-~~~tratl0!') \!et-'~i(~:le
AUTH: A/HARNEY, Pe F=; B/CRAFT, 0~ be' JR2; C/'J0HNSON~ R: G=
LUX~: National Aeronautics and Space Administrat~on: Ames Research Center',
.-. ... .. • • •• '. t • •- ••-. .;. ~ ~ •••-. ,;:
~iHi : h~.-" HtJL ..·/ r~n- Mi.}"1.'.: I". ':': S ,., ,...-..... ·.if·' I;' ;'.i i 1'_n:ir1iL=nii i·_'r'~l::)f fet t Fie 1ci~ (=~3 \ if =
tJf\iITE[; STATE::~ rre~=~eri~e(! at .2:1~=;r lr~lerri: irr=;trtJrner~ta-t·i:.jri ::i';/m~=:=i-'(-i T •:._.:.j i ;.
VEHICLES/*TELEMETRY/*UPLINKING
i i ....··i 'IS ...\. i -j- ~-....- .. !....
nL":f1= f1:._~ :.; i=·]i
ASS:
ai rcraft tt-·~at \J~32: rernc:T.e~\~ f l()~).H·i tr~)rn R.c:~E:r:=; L)r';/ La1\2 :3l Ech1l2rci:=~ H1 r F()(c:e
Base and lffiP2Ct~d into a desi~na·ted crash 51 te on the laKe bed: The
c:()l~~tr:)11ec1 ir~r:;13C:·t (iefnGri:=~tr3t~Gt-'i (C~ID) r:'if()=;JrarH w:3:=~ 13 JC)lrit \!entiJre t)':-/ tt-'iE:
N3(lOnai Heronautlcs and Space RdmlnlSlral10r~ ((~RSA) and the Federal
Aviation Administrat'ion (FAA) to test passenger survivability using
13r\t,rn':=1t,r\~;} t-:·..eri)Set··ie (A\'f't<') tf) 1r·i(\~b·it t~()stc:r3'3t-\ iire:;7- ·irnpr()\fE: ~~a2:ser-~~~er
seats and restraints, dilU
~---~------------~-----------''''''-----------.----

NASA Technical Memorandum 85925
Remote Control of an Impact
Demonstration Vehicle
Paul F. Harney, James B. Craft, Jr., and Richard G. Johnson
Ames Research Center, Dryden Flight Research Facility, Edwards, California
1985
NI\5I\
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Ames Research Center
Dryden Flight Research Facility
Edwards, California 93523

REMOTE CONTROL OF AN IMPACT DEMONSTRATION VEHICLE
Paul F. Harney
James B. Craft, Jr.
Richard G. Johnson
NASA Ames Research Center
Dryden Flight Research Facility
Edwards, California
ABSTRACT
Uplink and downlink telemetry systems were
installed in a Boeing 720 aircraft that was
remotely flown from Rogers Dry Lake at Edwards Air
Force Base and impacted into a designated crash
site on the lake bed. The controlled impact
demonstration (CID) program was a joint venture by
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) and the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) to test passenger survivability using anti-
misting kerosene (AMK) to inhibit postcrash fires,
improve passenger seats and restraints, and improve
fire;retardant materials.
The uplink telemetry system was used to remotely
control the aircraft and activate onboard systems
from takeoff until after impact. Aircraft systems
for remote control, aircraft structural response,
passenger seat and restraint systems, and anthropo-
morphic dummy responses were recorded and displayed
by the downlink systems. The instrumentation
uplink and downlink systems are described.
Key words: Telemetry data, remotely piloted
aircraft, radio control, command and control.
INTRODUCTION
The full-scale transport, controlled impact demon-
stration (CID) was a result of the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) and the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA) aircraft safety
programs. Occupant survivability in a transport-
aircraft postcrash environment may be significantly
enhanced by minimizing fuel fires and improving
seat and restraint design features. Postcrash
fireballs resulting from the ignition of spilled
fuel during crash deceleration, wing breakup, and
fuel tank rupture result in a high percentage of
transport crash fatalities.
Impact from an otherwise survivable crash may
result in serious injuries or fatalities when the
occupant is subject to impact forces that compro-
mise the structural integrity of the fuselage and
cause failure of the floor, seat, and other
installed cabin equipment. The purpose of this
flight test program was to validate technology that
could improve aircraft occupant crash survivability
through reduced postcrash fire hazard and improve
crash impact protection.
The test consisted of a full-scale air-to-surface
survivable impact demonstration using a remotely
piloted transport aircraft on Rogers Dry Lake near
NASA Ames Research Center's Dryden Flight Research
Facility (Ames-Dryden) at Edwards AFB, California.
The aircraft was a typical four-engine turbojet,
intermediate-range transport (a Boeing 720
airplane) which entered airline service in the
mid-1960's (Figure 1).
The crash scenario was representative of an air-to-
surface impact survivable accident, such as a
missed approach or an aborted takeoff (Figure 2).
For the controlled impact, the landing gear was
retracted and the flaps extended. The airspeed and
vertical velocity were selected to maintain fuse-
lage integrity while acquiring vertical and longi-
tudinal acceleration data. Obstacles that would
open the aircraft fuel cells were installed at the
crash site to ensure dispersal of the fire-
retardant antimisting kerosene (AMK) fuel being
tested.
The onboard data acquisition system was designed to
collect aircraft and experimental performance data
from the takeoff of the aircraft through surface
impact and deceleration. Aircraft and experimental
data were recorded on board the aircraft and
simultaneously transmitted by a telemetry link to
ground recorders.
REMOTE CONTROL CONCEPT
The general remote operation concept (Figure 3)
consists of commands telemetered (or uplinked)
to the 720 aircraft and responses from the air-
craft telemetered (or downlinked) to the ground
receiving station.'
Uplink commands generated in the ground cockpit
were transmitted to the aircraft from either a pri-
mary or backup ground-based antenna. Commands were
received in the aircraft by means of antenna
diversity; that is, antennas were located on the
top and bottom of the aircraft for omnidirectional
telemetry coverage (Figure 4). Each antenna feeds
a separate receiver; the output of each receiver is
combined in proportion to its signal strength. The
combined output then becomes the single input to
one decoder. The decoder processes the uplink data
and generates the analog and discrete commands
listed in Table 3.
Commands generated by the remote control pilot in
the RPV lab are conditioned in redundant control
law computers before being encoded and transmitted
to the aircraft. Redundant uplink transmission
antennas could be selected by the flight engineer
at the remote pilot station.
The downlink PCM system used for control system
data contained aircraft instrumentation signals
that were used not only for display to the remote
pilot but also for evaluation of the aircraft
flying characteristics. There were two other PCM
systems containing research data, which are
described later. All PCM systems used transmit-
ters of different frequencies for top and bottom
antennas. Diversity combiners at the ground
receiving station blended the downlink reception
from the top and bottom antennas for omnidirec-
tional telemetry reception. Frequency pairs and
power bUdgets for the telemetry systems are shown
in Table 1. Uplink and downlink system charac-
teristics are shown in Table 2.
The diversity techniques for the uplink and down-
link telemetry system using top and bottom anten-
nas for omnidirectional radiation coverage are
described in Reference 1.
FLIGHT TERMINATION SYSTEM
The profile for the final remotely controlled crash
flight (Figure 5) was carefully considered to mini-
mize danger to ground population should the air-
craft primary system fail and control of the air-
craft be lost. The flight termination system was
an independent aircraft radio uplink at 421 MHz to
command an intentional crash of the CID aircraft
should this Occur. The termination system con-
tained several safety features to prevent inadver-
tent activation such as an interlocking arming
sequence and dual-coded command tones. The ter-
mination command would have energized appropriate
relays to complete sequences such as shutting the
engine fuel off, retarding throttles, lowering
landing gear, and commanding a pitch-down right
turn to the control system.
AIRCRAFT NOSE TELEVISION
Two forward-looking television cameras (a primary
color system and a backup black-and-white system)
were installed in the nose of the 720 aircraft.
These and certain other cockpit displays were pre-
sented to the pilot to aid in flying the aircraft
and in final guidance to the crash site.
The forward-looking television system featured
redundant links to monitors displayed in the ground
cockpit. The primary camera had its own trans-
mitter and upper-fuselage-mounted antenna. The
2
color television signal was received at the primary
telemetry receiving site and relayed by land line
to the remote cockpit. The black-and-white backup
camera transmitted on a different frequency from a
separate antenna mounted on the lower fuselage.
This signal was received on a different telemetry
antenna located on the same building that houses
the remote cockpit. The resulting television
images were presented simultaneously to the pilot
in the remote control cockpit. Either television
display provided enough out-the-front view to allow
the pilot to land the aircraft on a dedicated lake-
bed runway if the impact mission had to be aborted;
DOWNLINK TELEMETRY SIGNALS
Downlink instrumentation consisted of three PCM
systems. Two were dedicated to experimental data
and one, referred to under REMOTE CONTROL CONCEPT,
was dedicated to control system and aircraft data
(Figure 6). Antenna locations for the various
radio frequency functions are shown in Figure 7.
Control System Downlink
Data on the control system downlink generally con-
tained information about aircraft systems and
flying qualities. Some data were displayed in the
remote cockpit for pilot information and par-
tially duplicated indicators in the 720 cockpit
(Figure 8). For instance, along with the pre-
viously mentioned forward-looking television, the
pilot had standard airspeed, altitude, heading, and
engine instruments to aid in flying the aircraft.
In addition to data displayed for pilot infor-
mation, other telemetry parameters were used to
monitor aircraft system health in the mission
control center, which is described later. There,
system engineers monitored such things as autopilot
inputs and outputs, stability and control behavior,
and engine operation.
The fire-retardant antimisting kerosene (AMK) fuel
required special in-line degrader units that con-
verted the AMK back into a burnable form that could
be used by the aircraft engines. There was a
significant amount of instrumentation to monitor
the operation and status of the four AMK degraders.
Crashworthiness Data Downlink
Data on the two high-bit-rate PCM systems consisted
of several hundred high-frequency accelerometer
measurements on the aircraft framework to validate
structural deformation models and to analyze new
seat restraint designs. Several versions of
advanced crashworthy seat designs were instrumented
with accelerometers as were anthropomorphic dummies
placed in the seats (Figure 9). The interior of
the aircraft was photographed by ten high-speed
cameras mounted at various viewing angles to pro-
vide complete photographic coverage of seat and
occupant activity during aircraft impact.
The cameras, as well as the data system recording
components, were encased in fire- and penetration-
protected containers.
REFERENCE
mental onboard cameras and tape recorders were
successful.
(1) Harney, Paul F., "Di versity Techni ques for
Omnidirectional Telemetry Coverage of the
HiMAT Research Vehicle," NASA TP-1830, 1981.
Approximately 97 percent of the research data
telemetry from the aircraft to the mission control
center for real-time monitoring and recording for
later evaluation worked throughout the flight and
postcrash slide-out. Ten high-speed cameras to
record interior movement of dummies, equipment,
and panels were turned on by uplink commands, and
usable film was recovered from eight cameras. Two
cameras jammed shortly after being turned on.
Air Force Flight Test Center
Aeronautical Test Range
antimisting kerosene
AFFTC
AMK
ATR
NOMENCLATURE
The downlink data displayed in the remote cockpit
for pilot indications and displayed in the mission
control center for system status monitoring worked
perfectly. The two forward-looking television
cameras in the nose of the aircraft, which assisted
the pilot in remotely controlling the aircraft,
worked perfectly throughout the flight. The color
camera with the upper antenna became unusable only
after the impact of the 720 aircraft broke the lens
in front of the television camera, distorting the
view. The black-and-white camera with the bottom
antenna became unusable on initial impact.
CONDUCT OF THE MISSION
Initial flight testing was accomplished with the
720 aircraft manned not only to verify aircraft
modification integrity but also to practice the
remote control aspects of the mission. Of par-
ticular importance was qualification of the fuel
degrader units that restored the AMK to usable
fuel for engine operation. In addition, designs
for such functions as remotely flying t~e aircraft
through autopilot inputs, or remotely raising and
lowering landing gear and flaps, were refined
during the flight program. Large parts of the
manned flight series were used by the remote pilot
to practice the actual mission crash profile
(Figure 5). Using the visual television cues and
ILS-type guidance displays, approaches were flown
over the designated site to verify that the impact
scenario was not only feasible, but also within the
desired forward speed, vertical velocity, and
aircraft attitude limits. Fourteen rehearsal
flights were flown, during which, in addition to
the above, radio frequency signal strengths for
telemetry links and termination functions were
verified to be adequate over the mission profile.
The CID flights were area controlled in close coor-
dination with the remote pilot and monitored from
one of the mission control centers at Ames-Dryden.
Here the test conductor communicated with the test
aircraft, the chase aircraft, the remote pilot, and
the various disciplinary engineers monitoring data.
Radar space-position data were also displayed on
geographical plot boards to track the CID aircraft
in flight. Data from the aircraft were displayed
in various formats in both the main control center
(Figure 10) and an additional support room, the
Spectral Analysis Facility. Eighteen strip charts
were available in these rooms, displaying accelero-
meter data, system status, engine data, degrader
data, and aircraft performance.
Additional engineering-unit information was dis- CID
p1ay~d on one of several cathode ray tube (CRT)
formats for real-time monitoring and was listed in FAA
postflight data runs for troubleshooting or analy-
sis. Another CRT format to allow real-time moni- IRIG A
toring of the CID flight features alphanumeric go
or no-go information in color. This display is
used principally for discrete alarm or attention- ILS
getting information that must be readily noted by
personnel observing system status. For CID, the NASA
real-time displays showed temperature or over-
pressure warnings for the fuel degraders, and the
battery voltage status of the downlink data system. NRZ
controlled impact demonstration
Federal Aviation Administration
InterRange Instrumentation Group time
code "A"
instrument landing system
National Aeronautics and Space
Administration
non-return to zero
CONCLUDING REMARKS PCM
The controlled impact demonstration of a Boeing 720 RIDS
airplane was successfully completed on December 1,
1984, using a combination of proven and innovative RPV
techniques for telemetry and remotely controlled
vehicles. The requirements to guide the pilotless TM
test aircraft to the precise impact point and main-
tain exact flight conditions were met using a te1em- TV
etry command uplink and telemetry feedback downlink.
VHF
The uplink commands to control aircraft attitude,
speed, and systems, and to activate the experi- XMTR
pulse code modulation
radar information display system
remotely piloted vehicle
telemetry
television
very high frequency
transmi tter
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Table 1. Radio Frequency Power Budgets.
Uplink frequency is 1804.5 MHz; L-band downlink frequencies are 1462.5 MHz and
1480.5 MHz; S-band downlink frequencies are 2278.5 MHz, 2242.5 MHz, 2228.5 MHz,
and 2207.5 MHz; TV frequencies are 1727 MHz and 4860 MHz.
1At 100 watts for uplink, 4 watts for L- and S-band downlink, 5 watts for TV.
Table 2. System Characteristics.
Parameter
Bit rate
Word 1ength
Words/frame
Frame rate
Frames/data cycle
Output
Transmitter frequency
Transmitter deviation
Number of channels
Uplink
Fixed 96.768 kbit/sec
16 bits (10 bits analog,
6 bits discrete)
Variable 1 to 16
Variable depending on
words/frame
Manchester PCM
1804.5 MHz
±120 kHz
4
Control system PCM
160 kbit/sec
10 bits
80
200 per sec
10
NRZ PCM
1462.5 MHz
1480.5 MHz
±80 kHz
160
Downlink
Crash data PCM (2 systems)
1Mbit/sec
8 bits
129
969· per sec
10
NRZ PCM
2278.5 MHz
2242.5 MHz
2228.5 MHz
2207.5 MHz
±500 kHz
352 (2 systems)
Table 3. Uplink Commands.
Analog Di screte
Elevator (1)
Aileron (1)
Rudder (1)
Throttles (2)
Brakes (2)
Landing gear up/down (3)
Engine kill (4)
Engine fire extinguish (4)
Fl aps (3)
Throttle select (1)
Emergency brake (1)
Nosewheel steering (3)
Experiment cameral
recorder activation (14)
ECN 31591
Figure 1. Boeing 720 aircraft.
• Sink rate: "-'17 FPS
• Glidepath: 3.3 0 to 4.0 0
• Representative of a survivable accident
• Crash: air-to-surface; final approach/landing, missed approach, and/or
takeoff abort
• Aircraft configuration: landing gear retracted, flaps, spoilers (as required),
symmetrical/stabilized
• logitudinal velocity: "-'150 knots
• Gross weight: "-'180,000 Ib
AMK obstructions
f f II ,II Impact
-144'1111-- -----
__-------'III III 200 It
Impact goals: AMK - wing tank rupture, 20 to 100 gal/sec (single· point rupture),
4- to 5-sec exposure with positive AMK ignition, slide-out to
100 knots
Crashworthiness - survivable impact, maintain fuselage integrity,
vertical impact pulse (1 sec), longitudinal acceleration data
Frangible landing
lights
Figure 2. Impact scenario.
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command
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Terminate
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High
L-----I7
Note:
Active/standby switch andRadar data Trlplexlcomm switch are
on cockpit Instrument panel
Stick computer, SIBLINC, and
relay box are single units
AFFTC
Radar
(backup)
Figure 3. CID ground RPV control system.
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throttle
command
Elevator
Aileron
Rudder
commands
Mode select'
~ Engage/disengage
o
Terminate Command
1. Drive horlz. stab. max T.E.D.
2. Retard throttle
3. Kill engines
4. Lower gear
5. Apply brakes
6. Rudder hard over T.E.?
Disable switches are provided
lor manned flights
~ LDG. gear (up/dwn)
o
Engine kill (4)
Flaps (up/dwn)
box
relay
Uplink
~----J-----+I N.W. Steering
Terminate
command
1 and 2
• Mode select
For RP\iillghts this will be
In glide path/auto position.
.--I--....-(}---t------<~ Pneumatic brakes
Terminate
command
3,4, and 5
Upper antenna
~~nt:nLn-a---'"
A TerminateAi signal
Uplink~ Lower antenna
~TrlPlex antenna
IUplinkcommand
Figure 4. CID airborne RPV control system.
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Figure 5. CID impact flight profile.
Tape
recorder
#1 &#2
Tape recorder #1
Tape recorder #2
Tapa recorder #1 & #2 r:::-::::::::1 'f
I--.....---------__l~ L band
• All equL.IP-m-e-n-t-b-at.Jtery powered lor crash ~
• Two tape recorders lor redundancy XMTR
• Tape recorders run at 60 IPS (15 minutes of data)
3. Control
system _
downlink
data
2. AMKdata-
1. ~::'~~iness _ Signal
data conditioning
Figure 6. Onboard instrumentation.
7
S·band downlink
Primary TV
S·band downlink
VHF radio
L·band uplink
L·band downlink
Terminate ~s~e~c~o~nd;'a~ry;=tTv"ifC::::JS7;~CCC:::9---E~::i=;::::,=,;:;
VHF radio
L·band uplink
L·band downlink
C·band radar beacon
Figure 7. Antenna locations.
ECN 28021
Figure 8. Remote control cockpit.
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• 20 instrumented passenger seats
• 157 fuselage accelerations
• Total measurements-352
frequency response up to 180 Hz
{
13 instrumented dummies
52 accelerations, pelvis,
thorax and head
• Single axis
Accelerometers • Biaxial
• Triaxial
Figure 9. Accelerometer locations.
ECN 20643
Figure 10. Mission control center, blue room.
9
1. Report No. I 2. Government Accession No. 3. Recipient's Catalog No.
NASA TM-85925
4. Title and Subtitle 5. Report Date
IMPACT DEMONSTRATION VEHICLE April 1985REMOTE CONTROL OF AN
6. Performing Organization Code.
7. Author(s) 8. Performing Organization Report No.
Paul F. Harney, James B. Craft, Jr. , and Richard G. Johnson H-1282
10. Work Unit No.
9. Performing Organization Name and Address
NASA Ames Research Center
Dryden Flight Research Facility 11. Contract or Grant No.
P.O. Box 273
Edwards, California 93523
13. Type of Report and Period Covered
12. Sponsoring Agency Name and Address Technical Memorandum
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Washington, D.C. 20546 14. Sponsoring Agency Code
RTOP 505-45-11
15. Supplementary Notes
This paper was prepared as paper 542 for the Instrument Society of America 31st International
Instrumentation Symposium, San Diego, Calif. , May 6-9, 1985.
16. Abstract
Uplink and downlink telemetry systems were installed in a Boeing
720 aircraft that was remotely flown from Rogers Dry Lake at Edwards
Air Force Base and impacted into a designated crash site on the lake
bed. The controlled impact demonstration (CID) program was a joint
venture by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to test passenger sur-
vivability using antimisting kerosene (AMK) to inhibit postcrash fires,
improve passenger seats and restraints, and improve fire-retardant
materials.
The uplink telemetry system was used to remotely control the air-
craft and activate onboard systems from takeoff until after impact.
Aircraft systems for remote control, aircraft structural response, pas-
senger seat and restraint systems, and anthropomorphic dummy responses
were recorded and displayed by the downlink systems. The instrumenta-
tion uplink and downlink systems are described.
17. Key Words (Suggested by Author(s)) 18. Distribution Statement
Telemetry data Unclassified-unlimited
Remotely piloted aircraft
Radio control
Command and control STAR category 06
19. Security Classif. (of this report) 20. Security Classif. (of this page) 21. No. of Pages 22. Price"
Unclassified Unclassified 10 A02
*For sale by the Nat~ona1 Techn~ca1 Informat~on Serv~ce, Spr~ngf~e1d, Virginia 22161.

·.
•
...
